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Torts-Proximate Cause in Strict-Liability Cases
A recent Indiana case, Galbreath v. Engineering Construction
Corp.,' represents a new approach to the problem of proximate cause
in tort cases involving strict liability. Defendant in this case used dyna-
mite to blast rock-an abnormally dangerous activity for which strict
liability is imposed under Indiana law.2 The explosion broke a high-
pressure gas pipe, and the escaping gas ignited when it came into contact
with a backhoe engine operating nearby. Plaintiff, who was repairing
the broken pipe, was severely burned. He sought to hold defendant
strictly liable for his injury, but the trial court sustained a demurrer to
his complaint3 on the ground that strict liability for blasting was limited
to damage caused by vibrations or flying debris.4 The Indiana Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that strict liability should ex-
tend to any harm that is a reasonably foreseeable result of an abnor-
mally dangerous activity.5
Strict liability has been gradually increasing in importance in tort
law during the past century. Traditionally it has been imposed when
damage is done by trespassing livestock' or by wild7 or vicious' animals.
Since the landmark case of Rylands v. Fletcher,9 many courts have also
imposed strict liability for harm resulting from "ultrahazardous"'' or
'_ Ind. App. -, 273 N.E.2d 121 (1971). Defendant's petition for transfer to the Indiana
Supreme Court was denied. Letters from Frank E. Tolbert, counsel for defendant, to the writer,
Jan. 24, 1972, and from J.T. Hillis, counsel for plaintiff, to the writer, Jan. 25, 1972.
2Enos Coal Mining Co. v. Schuchart, 243 Ind. 692, 188 N.E.2d 406 (1963).
3Plaintiff also alleged that defendant had conducted its blasting operations negligently. On
this allegation the case went to the jury, and the verdict was for defendant, but the court of appeals
held that there had been error in the judge's instructions to the jury. - Ind. App. at. - ,
273 N.E.2d at 129-31.
1d. at __, 273 N.E.2d at 122.
'Id. at , 273 N.E.2d at 124-29.
6E.g., Page v. Hollingsworth, 7 Ind. 317 (1855); Johnson v. Robinson, Il Mich. App. 707,
162 N.W.2d 161 (1968) (per curiam); see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 76,
at 496-99 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. A few courts have rejected strict liability
for trespassing livestock. E.g., Saldi v. Brighton Stock Yard Co., 344 Mass. 89, 92, 181 N.E.2d
687, 690 (1962); Bethune v. Bridges, 228 N.C. 623, 46 S.E.2d 711 (1948).
7E.g., Collins v. Otto, 149 Colo. 489, 369 P.2d 564 (1962); Smith v. Jalbert, 351 Mass. 432,
221 N.E.2d 744 (1966); see PROSSER § 76, at 499-500. Again, a few courts have rejected strict
liability in this situation. E.g., Hansen v. Brogan, 145 Mont. 224, 400 P.2d 265 (1965).
'E.g., Zarek v. Fredericks, 138 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1943); Hill v. Moseley, 220 N.C. 485, 17
S.E.2d 676 (1941); see PROSSER § 76, at 500-03.
'L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), affg Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. I Ex. 265 (1866).
"RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938).
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"abnormally dangerous"'" activities.' 2 More recently, under the doctrine
of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. ,'3 manufacturers and sell-
ers have been held strictly liable for damage caused by defective prod-
ucts. "
Strict liability, like liability based on negligence, is limited by the
requirement of actual causation. A defendant cannot be liable unless his
conduct is an actual cause of the plaintiff's harm-that is, unless the
plaintiff would not have been injured but for the defendant's conduct. I5
In many cases, however, both in negligence and strict liability, courts
have found it necessary to adopt a further limitation, a rule that can be
used to distinguish remote from proximate causes, so that a defendant
will not be held responsible for every harmful result of his activities. In
negligence cases, most courts have adopted foreseeability as a criterion
for proximate cause: a defendant is liable only for harm that is a reason-
ably foreseeable result of his negligence." In strict liability, on the other
hand, no such consensus has developed, and courts have approached the
question from several different viewpoints.
Before examining the various approaches that the courts have
taken to the problem of proximate cause in strict-liability cases, it will
be worthwhile to summarize the types of situations in which they have
been faced with this problem. These situations may be divided roughly
into two groups: a group of cases in which the plaintiff's harm did not
result from the risk that led the courts to impose strict liability on the
defendant, and another group in which the plaintiff's injury resulted
from the defendant's conduct in an indirect manner.
Courts usually have not held the defendant liable when the plain-
tiff's injury does not result from the risk for which strict liability is
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
"E.g., Guilford Realty & Ins. Co. v. Blythe Bros. Co., 260 N.C. 69, 131 S.E.2d 900 (1963);
see PROSSER § 78, at 505-16. The rule of Rylands v. Fletcher is now accepted by about thirty
states. Id. at 509. Many other states have imposed a similar strict liability for abnormally danger-
ous activities under an "absolute nuisance" theory. Id. at 512-13.
359 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
"See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A (5th ed. 1970);
PROSSER § 98.
Probably the most important application of strict liability is in the field of workmen's compen-
sation. However, workmen's compensation is not within the scope of this note, as it is based on
statutory provisions rather than common law. For a discussion of the limitations on the extent of
liability in workmen's compensation see Note, Workmen's Compensation-What Is the Range of
Compensable Consequences of a Work-Related Injury? 49 N.C.L. REV. 583 (1971).
"See PROSSER § 41; Byrd, Actual Causation in North Carolina Tort Law, 50 N.C.L. REV.
261 (1972).
"See PROSSER § 43; cf Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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imposed on the defendant. For example, the owner of trespassing live-
stock is strictly liable for damage that such animals ordinarily do, such
as destruction of grass or crops, 7 or the breeding of a scrub bull with a
pedigreed cow;'8 but ordinarily there is no liability for attacks on peo-
ple. 9 If a person knows that an animal he owns has a vicious propensity,
he is strictly liable for any damage that results from that propensity, 0
but usually not for damage caused by some other propensity of which
he does not know.2' The owner of a wild animal is not liable when it
frightens other animals by its mere appearance. 2 It has been held that
one who engages in an abnormally dangerous activity is strictly liable
only for damage that comes within the risk that makes the activity
abnormally dangerous. Finally, a manufacturer or seller is usually not
liable for harm resulting from a defective product if the consumer has
used it in an abnormal manner.24
The courts have also tended to limit strict liability when the plain-
tiff's harm results too indirectly from the defendant's activity. For in-
stance, when the defendant's cow trespassed in the plaintiff's barn and
broke through the floor, creating a hole into which the plaintiff fell, the
defendant was not held liable.21 Courts have been especially reluctant to
impose liability when there has been an intervening cause. An act of
God, 26 the action of an animal other than defendant's,27 and innocent28
TE.g., Page v. Hollingsworth, 7 Ind. 317 (1855).
jCrawford v. Williams, 48 Iowa 247 (1878); Kopplin v. Quade, 145 Wis. 454, 130 N.W. 511
(1911). See also Hilton v. Overly, 69 Pa. Super. 348, 353 (1918) ("we all know that [boars] almost
invariably attack each other").
"Klenberg v. Russell, 125 Ind. 531, 25 N.E. 596 (1890); Leipske v. Guenther, 7 Wis. 2d 86,
95 N.W.2d 774 (1959); cf. Harvey v. Buchanan, 121 Ga. 384,49 S.E. 281 (1904) (no liability when
trespassing mule attacks goat); Fox v. Koehnig, 190 Wis. 528, 209 N.W. 708 (1926) (no liability
when trespassing horse collides with car). But cf. McKee v. Trisler, 311111. 536, 143 N.E. 69 (1924)
(owner held liable when trespassing bull attacks mule).
10E.g., Zarek v. Fredericks, 138 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1943); Hill v. Moseley, 220 N.C. 485, 17
S.E.2d 676 (1941).
2 E.g., Karlow v. Fitzgerald, 288 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Fowler v. Helck, 278 Ky. 361,
128 S.W.2d 564 (1939).
nBostock-Ferrari Amusement Co. v. Brocksmith, 34 Ind. App. 566, 73 N.E. 281 (1905);
Scribner v. Kelley, 38 Barb. 14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862).
2Gronn v. Rogers Construction, Inc., 221 Ore. 226, 350 P.2d 1086 (1960); Foster v. Preston
Mill Co., 44 Wash. 2d 440, 268 P.2d 645 (1954); see Madsen v. East Jordan Irrigation Co., 101
Utah 552, 125 P.2d 794 (1942).
"See notes 57-58 and accompanying text infra.
zHollenbeck v. Johnson, 79 Hun 499, 29 N.Y.S. 945 (Sup. Ct. 1894).
2
'Golden v. Amory, 329 Mass. 484, 109 N.E.2d 131 (1952); Smith v. Board of County Rd.
Comm'rs, 5 Mich. App. 370, 146 N.W.2d 702 (1966), affld, 381 Mich. 363, 161 N.W.2d 561 (1968);
Murphy v. Gillum, 73 Mo. App. 487 (1898) (frost considered act of God); Nichols v. Marsland,
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or negligent" or intentional" intervening conduct by a third person
have all been held by some courts to relieve the defendant of liability.
Although these limitations on the extent of strict liability have not
always been applied in a uniform manner, the approach taken by most
courts, especially in cases involving animals and abnormally dangerous
activities, has been a restrictive one. Courts have refused to find the
defendant liable in situations that would certainly have called for liabil-
ity under the foreseeability test used in negligence cases. In applying the
same-risk limitation-the requirement that the plaintiff's harm result
from the same risk that caused strict liability to be imposed-courts
have often defined the risk narrowly so as not to include the damage
suffered by the plaintiff. For example, in Greeley v. Jameson,3 1 the
defendant's horse kicked the plaintiff and broke his leg. It had bitten
people in the past. The court required the plaintiff to show that the horse
had a propensity to kick people (not just a propensity to attack them)
and ruled that evidence of the earlier biting incidents did not subject the
defendant to strict liability when the horse kicked.3 2 In three cases, 33
the defendants were held not liable when their blasting operations fright-
L.R. 2 Ex. D. 1 (1876).
7Madsen v. East Jordan Irrigation Co., 101 Utah 552, 125 P.2d 794 (1942); Carstairs v.
Taylor, L.R. 6 Ex. 217, 220-21 (1871) (opinion of Kelly, C.B.).
2Kaufman v. Boston Dye House, Inc., 280 Mass. 161, 182 N.E. 297 (1932).
"'See Davis v. Atlas Assurance Co., 112 Ohio St. 543, 147 N.E. 913 (1925); Langabaugh v.
Anderson, 68 Ohio St. 131, 67 N.E. 286 (1903) (alternative holding). In Davis strict liability was
imposed for fires caused by operating railroads. Heat produced by the defendant's engine set fire
to gasoline fumes escaping from a railroad car that an employee of the plaintiff had opened. The
defendant was relieved of liability by the intervening conduct of the plaintiff's employee. In
Langabaugh a landlady leased her land to tenants who drilled for oil. The oil produced was stored
in an elevated tank, but it escaped and flowed down a hill into some open fires. The landlady was
held not liable because she had nothing to do with the storing of the oil, but the court said that
even if this had not been so, still she would have been freed from liability by the tenants' negligence
in failing to take measures against the escape of the oil.
10Cohen v. Brockton Savings Bank, 320 Mass. 690, 71 N.E.2d 109 (1947); cf. Kleebauer v.
Western Fuse & Explosives Co., 138 Cal. 497, 71 P. 617 (1903) (case based on nuisance theory
rather than strict liability); McGhee v. Norfolk & S. Ry., 147 N.C. 142, 60 S.E. 912 (1908) (same).
31265 Mass. 465, 164 N.E. 385 (1929).
"An even more extreme case is Bennett v. Mallard, 33 Misc. 112, 67 N.Y.S. 159 (Sup. Ct.
1900), in which it was held that the owner of a horse that had kicked people before in the road
was not liable when it kicked the plaintiff in its stall.
Ewing v. Prince, 425 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1968), held that the owner of a mare that has kicked
other horses is not liable when it kicks a person. In Karlow v. Fitzgerald, 288 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir.
1961), the court ruled that notice that a dog has bumped people is not notice that it will bite.
=Gronn v. Rogers Construction, Inc., 221 Ore. 226, 350 P.2d 1086 (1960); Madsen v. East
Jordan Irrigation Co., 101 Utah 552, 125 P.2d 794 (1942); Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 44 Wash.
2d 440, 268 P.2d 645 (1954).
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ened minks on a mink ranch and caused them to kill their young. The
risk that makes blasting abnormally dangerous was defined narrowly so
as not to cover the harm to the minks.3 1 Just as they have often restric-
tively applied the same-risk limitation, the courts have taken a similar
attitude toward the limitation based on indirect causation, placing an
extreme emphasis on intervening causes. In Kaufman v. Boston Dye
House, Inc.,3 5 the defendant stored a highly inflammable petroleum
product called varnolene on its property-an abnormally dangerous
activity. The varnolene escaped into a creek and caught fire when a
gasoline engine operated by a third party backfired and emitted sparks.
The defendant was held not liable because of the intervening cause. In
similar situations in negligence cases, liability has been found although
there was an intervening negligent"6 or even intentiona3 7 act-whereas
here the act of the third party was not even negligent.
This restrictive approach seems quite unjustified and indeed is in-
consistent with the reasons justifying the concept of strict liability itself.
The purpose of the same-risk limitation is to avoid holding a defendant
liable without negligence when, for instance, he transports explosives
and his vehicle strikes a pedestrian who suddenly darts into his path,3
or when he stores varnolene that escapes from his premises and, instead
of starting a fire, merely turns the plaintiff's grass brown-situations
that could have arisen just as easily if the defendant had been transport-
ing paper or storing ordinary paint. The purpose of the limitation is de-
feated when it is used to relieve a defendant from liability for damage
clearly caused by the dangerousness of his activity or the viciousness of
his animal. If the law requires the owner of an ill-tempered horse to
confine it or pay the price, he should be held liable for all its misconduct,
whether its evil disposition manifests itself by a bite or by a kick.3 1 If
uThis was the rationale used in the Gronn and Foster cases. In Madsen it was held that the
minks' action in killing their young was an intervening cause that relieved the defendant of liability.
1280 Mass. 161, 182 N.E. 297 (1932). It is not entirely clear that this was the actual holding
of the case rather than dictum. The court seems to have been reluctant to impose strict liability at
all because it felt that the varnolene was not sufficiently dangerous. But if there was strict liability,
it ruled, the plaintiff could not recover because of the intervening cause. The opinion does not make
clear upon which of these two grounds the court rested its decision.
31E.g., Watson v. Kentucky & Ind. Bridge & R.R., 137 Ky. 619, 126 S.W. 146 (1910).
3E.g., Richardson v. Ham, 44 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955).
'The illustration is from RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 519, comment e at 54 (Tent.
Draft No. 10, 1964).
"See G. WILLIAMS, LIABILITY FOR ANIMALS 302 (1939): "Would not it be much more satis-
factory to say that any mischievous propensity to draw human blood . is enough?" Professor
Williams' book is a comprehensive analysis of English animal law.
[Vol. 50
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the law requires a blaster to pay for the damage his explosions cause, it
should require him to do so regardless of whether the damage is to
valuable houses or to valuable minks; in each case the damage was
caused by the "non-natural," 4 extraordinary nature of the defendant's
blasting activity,4' and in each case the blaster is equally able to insure
against the loss or pass it on to his customers via higher prices.4 Just
as the purpose of the same-risk limitation is defeated by overly strict
application, the same is true of the intervening-cause limitation. If, as
in Kaufman, one who stores an inflammable substance is not liable
when someone innocently causes it to catch fire, when will he ever be
liable? 3 Fires do not ordinarily start by themselves. Such decisions, as
Harper and James pointed out, "appear almost to subvert the theory
of"" strict liability.
Because the courts enforce the limitations on strict liability so re-
strictively, plaintiffs often find it necessary-as did the plaintiff in
Galbreath v. Engineering Construction Corp . 4-to try to prove negli-
gence on the part of the defendant even though their injuries were caused
by a vicious animal or an abnormally dangerous activity. Only in this
way can the chance of recovery be maximized. Surely this is an
anomalous situation, for whenever the courts impose strict liability they
have determined that the dangerous nature of the defendant's activity
warrants holding him liable even without negligence.
While most courts have adopted a restrictive approach to
proximate cause in strict-liability cases, a few cases reflect a quite differ-
ent tendency in rejecting any limitations at all on strict liability. Deci-
sions from several states have held that the owner of trespassing live-
'
0Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 339 (1868).
"Possibly, however, the result reached in the mink-ranch cases can be supported on another
ground-that the plaintiff's minks were abnormally sensitive to the effects of the defendants'
explosions and the plaintiffs were not entitled to special protection for their abnormally sensitive
activity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964) provides that a
plaintiff cannot recover if his harm results from the abnormally sensitive nature of his own activity.
Several courts have adopted such a rule in nuisance cases. E.g., Rogers v. Elliott, 146 Mass. 349,
15 N.E. 768 (1888); Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Ore. 336, 198 P.2d 847 (1948).
"Concerning the availability of insurance as a reason for imposing strict liability see Escola
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concur-
ring); PROSSER § 75, at 495.
4A similar situation has arisen in the cases involving reservoirs. See cases cited note 24 supra.
The main danger involved in the storage of water in reservoirs is that the water may overflow or
the dam or dike break in a heavy rainfall. If the rainfall is treated as an act of God that relieves
the defendant of liability, very little is left of this area of strict liability.
12 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 14.5, at 811 (1956).
5 Ind. App.... -, 273 N.E.2d 121, 122 (1971).
1972]
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stock is liable for any damage they do, including infection of other
animals with disease" and attacks on other animals47 and people," re-
gardless of whether the owner had notice of their vicious propensities.
Similarly, a Missouri court held the owner of a vicious dog liable when
it became rabid and bit a child, even though a vicious dog is no more
likely than any other dog to catch rabies. 9 Courts in Louisiana"0 and
more recently in Michigan 5' have held the owners of animals strictly
liable despite the presence of intervening causes. The Louisiana court
explained its decision: "There must be security against [wild animals]
under all contingencies. 5 2
Clearly this approach is weighted as heavily on one side as the
prevailing tendency is on the other. If applied consistently to cases
involving abnormally dangerous activities, it would frequently produce
unjust results. A truck driver transporting explosives would be held to
strict liability when he struck a pedestrian who suddenly stepped out
into the street. A trespassing cow or a vicious dog that went to sleep on
a railroad track would subject its owner to strict liability if a train hit
it and derailed. Damage of this sort has nothing to do with the danger
of explosives or the viciousness of the animal, and it seems probable that
if faced with such a case even the courts that have adopted this
unlimited-liability approach would retreat from it.
If the majority of courts have taken an unduly restrictive approach
to the limitations on the extent of strict liability, and a minority have
taken an impossibly liberal approach, then there is a need for a middle
ground, a third alternative that will avoid the weaknesses of both. The
significance of the Galbreath case is that it adopts such an alternative.
The Galbreath court could have followed the mink-ranch cases and held
that only damage caused by flying debris and vibrations lie within the
risk that makes blasting abnormally dangerous. Or, following
Kaufman, it could have held that the operation of the backhoe engine
was an intervening cause that relieved defendant from strict liability.
But it refused to do so, holding instead that the extent of liability in
"Lee v. Burk, 15 111. App. 651 (1884).
"
t Decker v. Gammon, 44 Me. 322 (1857); Morgan v. Hudnell, 52 Ohio St. 552, 40 N.E. 716
(1895); Chunot v. Larson, 43 Wis. 536 (1878).
"Malone v. Knowlton, 15 N.Y.S. 506 (Sup. Ct. 1891); Nixon v. Harris, 15 Ohio St. 2d 105,
238 N.E.2d 785 (1968).
4
'Clinkenbeard v. Reinert, 284 Mo. 569, 225 S.W. 667 (1920).
OVredenburg v. Behan, 33 La. Ann. 627 (1881).
"Johnson v. Robinson, 11 Mich. App. 707, 162 N.W.2d 161 (1968) (per curiam).
5 2Vredenburg v. Behan, 33 La. Ann. 627, 634 (1881).
[Vol. 50
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strict-liability cases should be governed by the same rules that control
in negligence cases.53 Thus, instead of asking whether the burning of
escaping gas was within the risk for which strict liability is imposed on
blasters, it asked whether such an accident was foreseeable;54 similarly,
in dealing with the intervening cause, it asked whether the presence of
an "igniting agent, such as a backhoe engine,"55 was foreseeable. Its
answer was that these occurrences were not unforeseeable as a matter
of law. Therefore, it ruled, defendant's demurrer was improperly sus-
tained and the case should have gone to the jury. 6
The Galbreath court's use of the term "foreseeability" is not un-
precedented. Many courts have used the terminology of negligence law
in cases involving animals and abnormally dangerous activities. But
Galbreath is the first case that has adopted the foreseeability test after
careful consideration of the alternatives and proceeded to apply it with
the same liberality that courts use in negligence cases.57
The approach that the Indiana court adopted for abnormally dan-
gerous activities is the same approach that courts generally have fol-
lowed in cases imposing strict liability for defective products. At first
glance it seems surprising that courts have taken a different approach
to strict liability for defective products than for other types of strict-
liability cases, but the reason is not hard to find. Originally negligence
was the basis of liability for defective products. Since then, products-
liability law has passed from negligence to warranty to strict liability,
as the courts have increased the duty of the manufacturer or seller from
the ordinary duty of using reasonable care to the much more rigorous
duty of actually eliminating all defects that may cause injury.58 But while
'3The approach taken by the Galbreath court is similar to the one advocated in Harper,
Liability Without Fault and Proximate Cause, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1001 (1932).
5._ Ind. App. at - 273 N.E.2d at 124-27.
51d. at 273 N.E.2d at 128.
Old. at -, 273 N.E.2d at 129.
"A few isolated cases dealing with vicious animals have applied the foreseeability test in the
same realistic manner as in Galbreath but without the full discussion of the question that is found
in the Galbreath opinion. Reynolds v. Hussey, 64 N.H. 64, 5 A. 458 (1886); Stamp v. Eighty-Sixth
St. Amusement Co., 95 Misc. 599, 159 N.Y.S. 683 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Cockerham v. Nixon, 33 N.C.
269 (1850).
O'This transition, like most changes in legal doctrine, has been a gradual process, and in many
states it has not yet been completed. For instance, in North Carolina the strict-liability rule of
Greenman has not been followed. Even the concept of implied warranty has been limited to cases
in which the plaintiff and defendant are in privity of contract and to cases involving certain specific
classes of products, including foods in sealed containers and advertised products. Compare Terry
v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753 (1964), with Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Co., 270 N.C. 301, 154 S.E.2d 337 (1967).
1972}
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the level of duty has been raised substantially, the other provisions of
products-liability law have not undergone great change. The rules per-
taining to abnormal use and those determining when a manufacturer is
relieved of liability by the seller's negligence were not found unsatisfac-
tory in the negligence cases, and so the courts did not hesitate in carry-
ing them over into warranty and strict liability. As a result, regardless
of the theory on which liability is based, a manufacturer or seller is free
from liability when the plaintiff's injury is caused by his unforeseeable
abnormal use of a product-9 but not when the abnormal use can be
foreseen by the defendant." Again regardless of the theory used, a
manufacturer is liable despite the foreseeable intervening negligence of
a seller or some other third party,"' though there may be an exception
when the seller discovers the defect in the product and nevertheless
delivers it to the plaintiff without warning him of the defect. 2
Surely the approach adopted in Galbreath and the products-
liability cases is much superior to either of the other two viewpoints the
North Carolina products-liability law has been changed by the adoption of § 2-318 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-318 (1965). This section provides that the
seller of any defective product is liable for resulting personal injuries to the buyer, anyone in his
family or household, or any guest in his home.
51E.g., Schfranek v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 54 F.2d 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (negligence); Preston
v. Up-Right, Inc., 243 Cal. App. 2d 636, 52 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966) (strict liability); Vincent v.
Nicholas E. Tsiknas Co., 337 Mass. 726, 151 N.E.2d 263 (1958) (warranty).
6E.g., Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.2d 857 (1951)
(negligence); Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 II1. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E.2d 684
(1967), affd, 42 I11. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969) (strict liability); McSpedon v. Kunz, 271 N.Y.
131, 2 N.E.2d 513 (1936) (warranty).
6 E.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 III. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) (strict liability:
plaintiff collided with bus while driving truck with defective brakes which were manufactured by
defendant; passengers in bus injured and plaintiff compensated them for their injuries; held, plain-
tiff entitled to indemnity from defendant); Steele v. Rapp, 183 Kan. 371, 327 P.2d 1053 (1958)
(negligence: defendant sold fingernail polish remover without warning that it was explosive; plain-
tiff injured when fellow employee negligently dropped jar of it).
6 The seller's discovery of the defect usually has been held to relieve the manufacturer of
liability for negligence. E.g., Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 6 Cal. 2d 688, 59 P.2d 100 (1936); Ford
Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946). Virtually no warranty or strict-
liability cases have dealt with the question, but Professor Prosser has suggested that the same rules
will be followed in these cases as in the negligence cases. PROSSER § 102, at 668; cf. 2 L. FRUMER
& M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, § 16.01[4], at 3-32 (criterion should always be whether the
intervening conduct is foreseeable).
In California it has been held that a manufacturer cannot avoid strict liability for a defective
product by delegating the final stages of manufacturing and inspection to a seller. Thus he will
not be relieved of liability by the seller's discovery of a defect, or by anything else the seller "did
or failed to do." Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 261, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896, 899 (1964).
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courts have taken. Still, before concluding that it is the best approach
and the one that all courts should follow, there is one other approach
that should be examined, that adopted by the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.13 The Restatement's rules for limiting strict liability for defective
products 4 and trespassing livestock are fairly similar to those used in
Galbreath and the products-liability cases. However, the Restatement
differs from Galbreath in two important ways in its approach to strict
liability for wild and vicious animals and abnormally dangerous activi-
ties. First, the Restatement restricts strict liability for abnormally dan-
gerous activities to "the kind of harm, the risk of which makes the
activity abnormally dangerous,"6 and it limits the liability for vicious
animals to "harm which results from the abnormal dangerous propens-
ity of which the possessor knows or has reason to know"; 7 in other
words, it adopts the same-risk limitation that Galbreath rejected in
favor of a foreseeability test. Secondly, the Restatement makes no pro-
vision for any limitation on liability based on indirectness of causation.
In fact, two sections explicitly call for liability even when there is an
unforeseeable intervening cause.6
Is there a need for a limitation based on indirectness of causation?
The comments to the Restatement argue that because persons carrying
on abnormally dangerous activities or keeping dangerous animals "have
thereby for their own purposes created a risk which is not a usual
incident of the ordinary life of the community,"69 it is irrelevant whether
"The sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts dealing'with strict liability have not yet
been published in final form. Several sections are unchanged from the first Restatement and appear
there in the third volume. The sections that have been changed are included in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964). See 41 ALI PROCEEDINGS 397484 (1964), a
transcript of the American Law Institute meeting at which the proposed changes were considered.
"
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
ORESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 504 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964). The changes in this
section were approved by the American Law Institute. 41 ALI PROCEEDINGS 419-34 (1964).
"'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 519(2) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964.).
171d. § 509(2). Strict liability for wild animals is similarly limited in RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 507 (1938), which is unchanged in the Restatement Second.
"RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 510, 522 (1938). The American Law Institute rejected the
changes that Prosser, the Reporter for the Restatement Second, proposed in these sections.
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 510, Note to Institute at 32 (Tent. Draft No. 10,
1964), and id. § 522, Note to Institute at 82, with 41 ALI PROCEEDINGS 41941 (1964).
In two Caveats the Restatement leaves open the question whether a defendant should be
relieved of liability by the intentional act of a third person who deliberately sets out to cause the
injury to the plaintiff which in fact occurs. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 510, 522 (1938). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964), holding that a defendant
is not liable for harm caused by the abnormally sensitive nature of the plaintiff's activity.
"RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 522, comment a at 48 (1938). This section is concerned specifi-
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the risk materializes in a foreseeable or unforeseeable manner. In addi-
tion, a second argument can be made in support of this position. When
a defendant is held liable for foreseeable harm caused by his negligence,
it is because the law considers him to have acted wrongfully in failing
to provide against a risk of harm to others that he has created. When
he is relieved of liability for unforeseeable harm, it is because he could
not be expected to provide against a risk the existence of which he could
never have realized. But strict liability is based on an entirely different
ground; it is in the nature of an abnormally dangerous activity that a
person cannot provide against the risks involved-without abandoning
the activity, which the law does not require him to do. Instead, strict
liability is based on a requirement that the defendant make compensa-
tion for any harm that his activity causes. The courts allow him to
engage in his dangerous activity only on condition that he pay for all
harm done, a condition that has nothing to do with foreseeability.
There is an answer to these arguments, however. It is based on the
belief that the courts should not deal more harshly with conduct the law
allows than with conduct the law condemns. Consider a type of negli-
gent activity, such as drunken driving. This conduct is often at least as
dangerous as an abnormally dangerous activity or the keeping of an
abnormally dangerous animal. When an intoxicated person drives a car,
he has certainly "for [his] own purposes created a risk which is not a
usual incident of the ordinary life of the community"; 0 and he is unable
to provide against this risk, except by ceasing to drive while drunk. In
other words, he is in virtually the same situation as one who carries on
an abnormally dangerous activity. The only difference is that the law
does not require a person to refrain from abnormally dangerous activi-
ties, but it does require a person to refrain from driving while drunk.
Yet a drunken driver is not liable for the unforeseeable results of his
negligent activity. Why should a broader liability be imposed by the
courts on a person whose activity is permitted because it is socially
beneficial despite its risks than on a person who creates a risk that is
completely unjustified? As Professor Albert A. Ehrenzweig explained,
strict liability is a substitute for negligence; courts give permission to
engage in an activity instead of labeling it negligent, but "strict liability
is the price an entrepreneur must pay for that permission. . . . IT]hat
cally with abnormally dangerous activities. Similar language is used in connection with dangerous
animals at id. § 510, comment a at 24.
7
°RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 522, comment a at 48 (1938).
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liability extends to all harm for the infliction of which he would be liable
but for the permission . . . no less-no more."7'
As for the Restatement's other difference from the Galbreath ap-
proach-the adoption of the same-risk limitation-this is certainly not
a point in its favor. There is nothing wrong with the same-risk limitation
as such, but, as discussed previously, it has been misapplied in cases such
as Greeley v. Jameson72 and the mink-ranch cases,73 and thus it carries
with it a series of dubious precedents. The foreseeability rule can ade-
quately serve the same purpose as the same-risk rule (discoloring a
neighbor's lawn is not a foreseeable result of storing an inflammable
liquid; hitting a pedestrian who runs into the road is not a foreseeable
result of transporting explosives) and it does not bear the burden of
these unfortunate precedents. 74
Thus the Galbreath approach is not only preferable to the restric-
tive and the unlimited-liability approaches; it also proves superior to
that of the Restatement on both their points of difference. Hopefully
future cases will adopt the Galbreath viewpoint, for that approach seems
to be the best method for confining strict liability within reasonable
limits while at the same time ensuring that technical and arbitrary
distinctions will not deprive plaintiffs of its benefits.
ROBERT STARR GILLAM
71A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT 50 (1951).
72265 Mass. 465, 164 N.E. 385 (1929).
7"The Restatement endorses the mink-ranch cases. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519,
Note to Institute at 52 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
"It has been pointed out that the foreseeability rule is applied in a different manner in strict-
liability cases than in negligence cases. In the latter, the question is whether "the risk can be
foreseen at the time of the negligent act"; in strict liability, on the other hand, the defendant is
liable if "the risk of harm can be seen at the time of embarking upon the activity." Note, Strict
Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 916, 935 (1964).
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FRANK W. HANFT
This issue of the North Carolina Law Review is dedicated to Gra-
ham Kenan Professor of Law Frank W. Hanft, who is retiring this year
after forty-one years at the School of Law.
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